Articles written in Sadhana
Volume 34 Issue 3 June 2009 pp 501-527
This paper deﬁnes cooperation as the process of coordinating the objectives and activities of supply chain (SC) members. It also focuses on cooperation as a solution for hybrid coordination mechanism to form the basis for semiconductor industry supply chain management. In the complex and competitive environment of semiconductor industry supply chain, independent system members are facing the difﬁcult task of providing/sharing incentives resulting from e-market activities in a fair and equitable manner. So, various other activities are necessary for the e-market to make revenue sharing operations more stable and reliable. In this context, the importance of coalition in enhancing the e-market capability, for revenue generation and sharing, is used to develop a possible mechanism for financial compensation to the supply chain members. Interpreting the supply chain as cooperation, the concepts of the Shapely value are used in this paper for analysing the revenue sharing problem. The motivation behind such a scheme is to align the supply chain members’ cost structure with the bidding value during auction and bargaining for e-procurement. The appropriateness of the Shapely value is verified to ensure that a stable solution exists. The practical implication of this paper is how to make right decisions about revenue sharing. The principal contribution of this approach is for establishing a pooling coalition in order to provide a stable and cooperative solution.
Volume 34 Issue 5 October 2009 pp 767-798
Typically, supply chain members are dependent on each other to manage various resources and information. The conﬂicting objectives and lack of coordination between supply chain members may often cause uncertainties in supply and demand. The basic elements of coordination theory like interdependency, coherency and mutuality may help in effective ﬂow of information and material between the dependent supply chain members. Supply chain contract can be an effective coordination mechanism to motivate all the members to be a part of the entire supply chain. There are different types of supply chain contracts such as buy back and quantity ﬂexibility contracts. Supply chain performance may be substantially improved by properly designing the contracts to share risks and rewards. The objective of this paper is to explore the applicability of coordination elements through an analytical model in three-level (Manufacturer–distributor–retailer) serial supply chains using contracts. The model evaluates the impact of supply chain contracts on various performance measures. The impact of some contract may be on some speciﬁc performance measure only, which helps managers to choose the type of contract if there is an objective of improving certain performance measure before hand. In three-level supply chains, the contracts are designed at two distinct interfaces: Manufacturer–distributor and distributor–retailer. The model demonstrates the complexity in evaluating the decision variables of three level supply chains. The proposed model is a novel approach to apply coordination theory at various levels of supply chain. The model also presents how the coordination elements are related to each other in various coordination cases.